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ABSTRACT 
 
TOLERATING RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: 
THE STATE AND THE REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM  
IN INDONESIA 
 
 
By 
 
PERMANA, Muhammad Prayoga 
 
Despite its remarkable democratic transformation, it is interesting to note that the problem of 
religious freedom and violences under the banner of religious ideology are rampant in Indonesia. 
Meanwhile, instead of protecting the freedom and security, the state has turned its blind eye towards 
the vigilant groups of Islamic fundamentalism. This research aimed to discover some factors deter-
mining the tolerating religious intolerance tend to do policy. The research suggests that in historical 
review, the state has been accommodating the fundamentalist not only for ideological purpose but also 
political, it affects state’s commitment to protect religious freedom. The state also encountered with 
dysfunctional democracy while political openings with inadequate institutional constraint have facili-
tated the rise of Islamist political identity in public sphere. In addition, despite its close relations to the 
fundamentalists during the history, the state actually maintained its stance towards coexistence be-
tween Islamism and secularism at the same time. The ambiguity provides a room for the fundamental-
ist to infiltrate the decision making process.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
I.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Western leaders often called Indonesia as the role model of a new democracy. In 1998, 
Indonesia surprisingly turned from a militaristic and authoritarian state to democracy with 
profound overall impression: it is the place where Islam and democracy can coexist. 
Indonesia’s vibrant democracy sustained country’s stability to survive amidst the global crisis 
with substantial growth at roughly 6 to 7% recently.  The facts impressed the former United 
States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, she praised Indonesia’s great democratic 
transformation as a step forward. Clinton highlighted, “If you want to know if Islam, 
democracy, modernity and women rights can coexist, go to Indonesia”.1 Three years later, 
Indonesian democracy was still adorable in western leaders’ point of view. British Prime 
Minister David Cameron exalted Indonesian democracy as the role model that other Muslim 
countries are seeking to be. Indonesia represents an example where democracy emerges as 
the people’s choice instead of extremism and dictatorship.2  
Those applauses were partly right as Indonesia has shown a remarkable performance 
in democratic transformation compare to the other Islamic predominated states (see table 1 
below). According to the 2011 report of Freedom House, Indonesia’s democracy discloses 
more evidence for the thesis of Islam and democracy compatibility. It was the only Muslim 
predominated country with a free label. Indeed, it suggested that while the general Muslim 
worlds are in democratic deficit, Indonesia has undergone the opposite positive direction.  
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Table 1.  Islamic Predominated Countries and Their 2011 Freedom Index 
Country Freedom Index 
Indonesia Free 
Pakistan Partly Free 
Nigeria Partly Free 
Bangladesh Partly Free 
Egypt Not Free 
Iran Not Free 
Turkey Partly Free 
Country Freedom Index 
Sudan Not Free 
Algeria Not Free 
Morocco Partly Free 
Iraq Not Free 
Afghanistan Not Free 
Malaysia Partly Free 
Uzbekistan Not Free 
Source: Freedom House, 2011 
 Beyond its extraordinary performance, did stories from the field actually depict 
world’s impression on Indonesian democracy? For some minorities and to certain degrees, 
Indonesia is no model for Muslim democracy as there were some attempts to turn Indonesia 
from a secular democratic state to conservative Islamic state by threats and street level 
violence upon the minorities by some non-state actors under the banner of the highest truth.3  
Some evidences suggest that there were some dangerous attacks to Ahmadiyah1, a sect in 
Islam that accounted for small number of Indonesian minority. FPI (Front Pembela Islam or 
                                                          
1 Ahmadiyah is a sect within Islam that emerged in South Asia during British colonization before it 
spread quickly across Muslim world. Despite its numerous followers in Indonesia, Ahmadiyahh is 
deemed as blasphemous. Many Islamic preachers in the country blamed Ahmadis beliefs that 
supporting Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of Ahmadiyahh, as another prophet after Muhammad.  
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Islamic Defenders Front)2 raided Ahmadis facilities in South Sulawesi4; vandalized their 
mosques in Tasikmalaya, West Java and backed the tragic event of Cikeusik where six of 
Ahmadiyahh followers were killed.5 In 2012, Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM)3 received 
serious intimidations from the same group. At the time, the university intended to hold a 
public discussion with Irshad Manji4, a controversial Canadian Muslim author. Unfortunately 
deemed to security concerns, the event was cancelled despite the fact that in Indonesian soil, 
academic institutions have the highest degree of independence and integrity that even state 
and military can’t freely intervene. Some alumnus perceived the pressure as a setback 
towards ‘religious fascism’.6  
The situations finally culminated and draw international attention after ‘the Lady 
Gaga Saga’ that resulted to similar cancellation. The FPI threatened to deploy their members 
to the street if Lady Gaga successfully landed in Indonesian soil.7   Those cases emerged as 
major defeat for Indonesian security in democratic era and the most concerned matters, 
political setback for democracy, freedom and pluralism.  
The conventional wisdom of democracy often said that the real democracy guarantee 
individual religious belief and obligate the state to create government agencies that grant 
fundamental human rights with no discrimination. In fact, Indonesia’s democracy can do a 
little to prove what supposed to be. The state was seemingly weak to highlight its role as the 
defender of religious pluralism. It is evidenced that Titi Sartika, the head of Ahmadiyah’s 
                                                          
2 FPI (Front Pembela Islam) or the Islamic Defenders Front is a fundamentalist group, pressure group 
and vigilante jihad paramilitary that often considered as notorious because of their violences against 
the enemy of Sharia.  
3 Universitas Gadjah Mada or Gadjah Mada University is the oldest public university in Indonesia. 
The university has long been considered as a permanent member of top three university across the 
nation. It currently has more than 50.000 students registered in various program.  
4 Irshad Manji is the author of controversial book called ‘The Problem With Islam Today”. Irshad 
claimed her book as an open letter for reforming Islam.  The covers wide range of  issues such as 
gender, slavery and contemporary understanding of Islam.  
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Women Group in Bekasi, West Java expressed her fear to perfom her religious activities. She 
said, 
”We get nervous every time we go to Mosque, especially those with children, we 
are afraid to bring them. The women often don’t go to pray if we see people with 
white robes”.  
In Cikeusik West Java when Ahmadiyah community was attacked by militants, a victim 
namely Ahmad Masihudin witnessed, 
”They held my hands and cut my belt with machete. They cut my shirt, pants and 
undershirt. They took my money and cell-phone. They tried to take off my 
underwear and cut off my penis. I was laying in fetal position. I tried to protect 
myself but my left eye was stabbed. Then I heard them say, ‘he is dead, he is 
dead”. 8 
The Jakarta Post (2013) also recorded several recent attacks on religious minorities to 
illustrate that government were unwilling to cope with the serious problems. 
Table 2.  Recent Attacks on Religious Minorities (2012- early 2013) 
April 6, 2013 An Islamic boarding school in Tasikmalaya that allegedly 
spread perverted understanding of Islam attacked by 500 
hard liners 
March 21, 2013 Officials broke HKBP’s (Batak Protestant Community) 
unfinished church due to permit issues in Bekasi 
Februari 14, 2013 an Ahmadis Mosque in Bekasi was closed down by 
Bekasi Municipal Official 
January 27, 2013 Islamic groups block the BNKP church in Bandung, 
West Java from holding sunday mass 
October 25, 2012 The hard liners FPI assaulted Eid celebration on An Nasr 
mosque 
August 26, 2012 Two killed and dozens of houses demolished as The 
Sunnis rampage through Shia community villages in 
Madura, East Java 
August 6, 2012 St. Johannes church in Bogor, West java was officially 
sealed by the local administration. The government 
5 
 
ignored permit application submitted by the christians in 
2007 
April 22, 2012 a HKBP church service in Bekasi, West Java was broke 
up by local muslim groups 
April 20, 2012 Hard liner Islamic groups vandalized Ahmadis Mosque 
in Tasikmalaya 
March 16, 2012 Some unidentified men fired 20 shots into a catholic 
church in Indramayu, West Java 
February 17, 2012 Crowd raided Nur Hidayah Ahmadis Mosque in Cianjur, 
West Java 
January 23, 2012 Two hard line group raided Sunday service at a Christian 
Church in Taman Yasmin, Bogor West Java 
January 1, 2012 Some hardliners attempted to prevent Christians in GKI 
Taman Yasmin to perform their sunday service 
Source: The Jakarta Post and Kompas, April 5, 2013 
The Rise of Islamic Hardliners and Its Policy Dilemma 
 The existence of religious non-state actors who resort on violence to convey their 
aspirations is a new phenomenon in Indonesian democracy. During 32 years Suharto’s 
authoritarian era, Islamic hardliners were massively suppressed under the government control.  
It is indeed, brought a good impact for Indonesian society as. Since then, Islamic movement 
emerged as a lifeline for the people. Muhammadiyah5 and Nahdlatul Ulama’6, the two largest 
Islamic organizations, instead of being formal parts of Indonesian politics, they were actively 
engaged in education and humanitarian action. Nowadays, they have been consistently 
promoting democracy under the state’s ideology and standing as defenders for pluralism.  
Nevertheless after 1998’s reform when the freedom of speech, expression and human rights 
were acknowledged by the government, the activities of Islamic hardliners on public sphere 
were more appealing and somewhat moved to negative direction against democracy and 
pluralism. The luminosity of Indonesian democracy suddenly turned as an irony, it is 
                                                          
5 Muhammadiyah is the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. They advocate individual 
interpretation of Quran rather than following ulama’s interpretation. Muhammadiyah known as a 
reformist sociologist movement. It often opposed to Nahdlatul Ulama.  
6 Nahdlatul Ulama’ is traditionalist Muslim group, often opposed to Muhammadiyah.  
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allegedly fueled destructive hardliners to be more powerful and counterattacked freedom and 
pluralism.9 
 Furthermore, unlike the previous regime (Soeharto’s 32 years administration), the rise 
of hardliners leads to equally unfavorable policy option for the government to deal with that 
is between indirectly supporting them or prosecuting them.  Even if democratic rights were 
infringed, some evidences proved that government was unable to protect the minorities. 
Setara Institute revealed the trend of religious violence by the hardliners has been growing 
steadily during the past 6 years.  
Chart 1. Number of Religious Violence10 
 
I.2 Research Questions  
 
The lack of government response to control the fundamentalist has turned the country 
to be a thug controlled state. 11 The New York Times in 2012 illustrated the situation in 
Indonesia as if the government turned their blind eye towards religious pressures. The US 
Commission for Religious Freedom Report suggested that Indonesia’s tradition on religious 
tolerance is facing some serious problems. Many evidences proved that the current 
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administration has tolerated extremist activities and some local legal aspects have strained 
religious freedom. Thus, state incapability to protect the minorities from religious pressure 
raises some questions: 
 
1. Why did the government tolerate the threat of Islamic fundamentalist who relied on 
violence to pursue their ends? 
2. How do the relations between the government and the fundamentalists?  
3. What are the problems faced by the government to protect religious freedom? 
 
In order to discover the causes of state’s failure in protecting religious freedom, this 
research is aimed at explaining some important factors hindering government’s policy to cope 
with the fundamentalist. The factors are the following:   
 
1. Power-seeking relations between the government and fundamentalist, explaining a 
mutual coexistence on power and legitimacy seeking. The relations affected 
government commitment to protect individual freedom.  
2. Explaining dysfunctional democracy as an internal factor. Fundamentalists often used 
the characteristic of Indonesia’s democracy such as public sphere to boost their 
influence.  
3. A policy towards coexistence of Islam and democracy in Indonesia.  Debates on 
Islamic influence in Indonesian statehood were endless during the history. Therefore, 
the government maintained coexistence of Islamism and secularism.  
4. Inadequate law provision in Indonesian legal structure. Protection of minority rights 
requires legal instrument to ensure state’s roles and the rights of minorties. Legal 
instrument also provides some directions for state to act.  
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I.3 Research Method 
 In order to analyze the factors, qualitative research method is used in the entire 
analysis. The focus of research method is based on discourse analysis in political science. The 
discourse analysis suggests institution (state) is being constructed by several interactions that 
include social interaction and discourses. In that sense, discourses such as political manifesto, 
political speeches, publication, TV program, legal acts and bills will be used to answer the 
questions of origin and rationale of state’s behavior. The discourses may also implicitly 
explain the stories behind some policy initiatives and options (Burnham, 2008).12  
 In addition, historical approach is also utilized in some particular contexts such as in 
explaining the patterns of state and Islamic fundamentalist relations. The use of such 
approach is aimed at understanding paradigm shift in a brief timeline. From there, the study 
may absorb some basic roots of the problem.  
 
I.4 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to investigate the causes of government policy 
which tolerated intolerance action of the fundamentalist. Problem of tolerating destructive 
fundamentalist action was highly questioned in general public and Indonesian scholars. There 
were some assumptions on conspiracy theory which relied on anonymous news leaks and 
whistle blowers occur lately, they one-sidedly claimed the fundamentalist as Indonesian 
intelligence paramilitaries or hidden state sponsored thugs. Therefore, a scholar explanatory 
is necessary to analyze the problem in academic frame. Moreover, conducting a research on 
government policy in this area is essential because freedom of religion and human rights is 
indispensable in a democracy.  
 
9 
 
I.5 Disclaimer 
 The context of this research was not intended for a study in any particular religion 
including Islam. Instead, this research perceived Islam as a different entity to Islamic 
fundamentalism. The latter was the focus as Islamic fundamentalism potentially is a threat 
whereas Islam per se was brought with no intention for aggressive political ambitions. In 
contrast to Islam, Islamic fundamentalism is sought as purely political movement under the 
banner of Islam with non religious ambitions.  
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Diagram I. Research Framework 
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Fundamentalist Activism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power Relations  
Government-Fundamentalist 
Maintaining Status Quo at the 
current degree of Islam and 
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Fundamentalist is the government source of 
power and legitimacy. Although the 
government perceived fundamentalists as a 
threat, they saw them as opportunity 
Prosecution of fundamentalist may boost 
fundamentalist power and legitimacy 
State cant easily ignore the influence of the 
fundamentalist so that they accomodate their 
interest in some policies. At the same time, 
state also promoting democracy 
 
Dysfunctional democracy 
Dysfunctional democracy indirectly allows 
the growing movement of the fundamentalist 
Legal Instrument Legal instrument provides some directions 
for state to act in protecting minorities 
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I.6 Literature Review 
I.6.1 State-Fundamentalist Power Seeking Relationship, a Discussion on Islamic 
Leviathan Theory 
 Nasr (2001) introduced the so called Islamic Leviathan theory. The theory illustrated 
the relations of the state and Islamist as a power seeking relations. He argued that Islamic 
Fundamentalism and its characteristic is apparently the source of state’s hegemony. Therefore, 
no surprise that even though the government considered Islamic fundamentalists as a threat, 
the state might see them as opportunity.   
To obtain such conclusion, he analyzed the situations in Malaysia and Pakistan.  In 
two countries, the circumstances depicted  the states were becoming the agent of Islamization 
and in some degrees allied with Islamist force. In such premises, state acted as an opportunist 
Islamizers rather than the rejectionist secularist. The opportunist Islamizers seek to 
accommodate Islam in politics for some critical periods but less likely involve them in the 
state’s cultural orientation. The state showed their dexterity on using Islam to serve their 
interest in garnering legitimacy.  
Yet, the state never attempt to dominate Islamic discourse or being active in Islamic 
political arena. Islamist in turn, seeks a greater access of resources and influence in public 
policy making process. 13 Haynes (1999) again argued that religious doctrines are often 
utilized for legitimatization by government. In a simplest way, many examples in Africa 
represent the pattern of politician co-opting the religious power to boost their electoral 
votes.14 
 What kind of legitimacy that the state was looking for? Ma’arif Institute did implicitly 
point out that the stance against the fundamentalists has its cost such as the fear of losing 
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public support. In Indonesia recently, the supports for fundamentalist movement and their 
characteristics are legally permitted. In that sense, the government tends to cooperate rather 
than conflict the fundamentalist. The main reason is that the government does not want to be 
perceived as the enemy of Islam as the fundamentalist might scrutinize them as infidel. Thus, 
the fear of future prejudice of becoming an infidel government might confuse policy maker to 
deliver a policy. Undoubtedly, the fundamentalist massively gained public support under the 
banner which claimed as promoting and defending Islam, the major religion so that they 
called themselves as the defender of good deeds and forbidding wrong. 15 In political arena, 
the notion of opportunistic politicians may open up another possibility of fundamentalist 
goals acceptance within the government entities. The careless political actor may work 
together with the fundamentalist by sacrificing the future of multi-religious and ethnic nation 
for the sake of their own political ambitions and wealth.16 
In the other hand, prosecution of Islamist may possibly strengthen their existence in 
society. Reflecting the lesson learn of authoritarian regime, the government prosecuted the 
illegal Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or PDI) led by the former Indonesian 
president, Megawati Soekarnoputri. The misled strategy garnered tremendous public 
sympathy. As a consequence of such mishandling, in 1999 PDI in turn won a landslide 
victory against the former ruling party and other newly created reformist parties. Having 
learned from the rise of PDI, government supposed to start a new strategy by using the 
enemies instead of marginalizing them. Therefore, instead of prosecuting any opposition as 
they did in the past, the state possibly tried to incorporate the fundamentalist. According to 
the 48 Laws of Power by Robert Greene (2000) that in order to obtain more power, any actor 
should be aware of their friendly political partner as they are more likely to betray and they 
are easily aroused to envy. They also may become spoiled and tyrannical. In contrast, hiring a 
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former enemy will be an answer as they are more loyal by their effort of proving something 
good for the main actor’s benefit. The strategy was part of know-how to use enemy for 
gaining profit and authority. Green proposes, ”you must learn to grab a sword not by its blade, 
which would could you, but by the handle which allows you to defend yourself. The wise 
man profits more from his enemies, than a fool from his friends”. 17 
All the above mentioned about power seeking relations have some impacts to state’s 
commitment toward religious freedom. a thesis that proposed by Susanti (2010) descirbed 
that in Indonesia the relations of Islamist and the state determine the degree of state ability to 
protect religious freedom. The state commitment towards minority is resulted from 
government’s stance towards various issues in public sphere. The stance sometimes affected 
by Islamic fundamentalists’ direct or indirect pressure within the government itself and many 
related organizations.18 The thesis derived its argument from the theory of secular state. It 
says that even if some polities strictly separated state and religion, religion’s influence to the 
state is inevitable.  
I.6.2 Dysfunctional Democracy and The Rise of Fundamentalism 
 Schumpeter(1950) defined democracy as in terms of free election. He defined 
democratic method as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote”. Schumpeter’s defintion of democracy has sharpened by Juan Liz (1978) by 
summarizing the criteria of democracy. He proposes democracy as “legal freedom to 
formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, 
free speech, and other basic freedoms of person; free and non violent competition among 
leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule; inclusion of all effective political 
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offices in the democratic process and provision for participation of all members of political 
community, whatever their political preferences”. In line with Linz and Schumpeter, 
Huntington holds a proposal that a regime is democratic to the extent that collective decision 
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidate freely 
compete for votes. Moreover, democracy also requires political freedom to speak, publish 
and assemble”. Those three experts viewed democracy in a sense of procedural democracy in 
which democracy itself sought as simply by the existence of free elections. In broader sense, 
democracy could be also defined by  popular control over the state that opposes  authoritarian. 
The latter implies harsh rule that conceptually incompatible with democracy.19  
 In the context of Indonesia, as the world has witnessed in the last two decades, had 
transformed from a militaristic and authoritarian state to a democracy with three free 
elections have been contested since 1999. Harsh rule acted by government such as abduction 
of political activist, supression of mass media never heard anymore. Some regulations for 
organization and assembly also has been relaxed.  
 From the late 1960’s to 1990’s Indonesian society faced the challenge of violences, 
abuses and pressures that directly exercised by state actors. Later after the demise of 
authoritarian regime, the paradox start occuring. The violence that used to be exercised by 
state actors nowadays turned to another violence exercised by non-state groups. Why did 
Indonesian democratic societies face such challenge?  
 Bauman (2002) on Schwarzmantel (2011) illustrated the situation of ‘society under 
siege’. In such circumstance, society faces continuous violence that exercised not only by 
terrorist attack but also by state agencies. He concluded violence is very natural and 
inseparable from politics. Non state groups will resort on violence once they could not find a 
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healthy sphere for discussion to convey their ends.  Furthermore, he suggested that violence 
rules when democracy is in a setback. In the other hand, it says that the absence of centralized 
state that could effectively enforce rules and regulations to the community makes the 
violence highly probable.20 
 Aside from the argument of natural relations between politics and violence, Kaye 
(2008) proposed another theory that democracy in extreme condition is likely to produce 
Islamist government.  At the beginning of the theory he suggested that political opening to 
democracy could facilitate moderate forces in politics but at the same time marginalize the 
hard liners. An option such as allowing the hard liners to participate legally in political arena 
may leads to certain degree of moderation. Still, the future confrontation among different 
interests may trigger some elements within the fundamentalist group to fight back. They 
possibly debate the benefit of involving in a democratic political system and finally perceive 
political system which involves them as corrupt and illegitimate.21  
Eubank and Weinberg (2010) pointed the similar epitome as Bauman. He argued that 
extremist assault is more likely appear in democracy because there is no institutional 
constraint in open societies that restrict their movement.22 The elements of democracy such 
as freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of forming any organization with 
less government control facilitate the robust growing fundamentalist movement. Any 
restriction that exercised by the government to limit their movement may seen as a political 
setback towards freedom of expression. The situation leads to indecisive policy making 
process to cope with the fundamentalist.   
Another postulate of some flaws in democracy explained an argument that political 
openings, liberalization and democratization basically cannot solve the problem of extremism. 
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It does not really mean that the more freedom a country turned to be, the less terror they may 
face. The traditional tenet across the globe that emphasized the importance of democracy was 
obsolete. Democracy can do little to stop extremism and somehow may worsen the stability. 
The study in Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and 
Morocco) showed that political reform often bring out intolerance and support to political 
violence. Political openings in those countries by some attemps on involving the 
fundamentalists to participate legally in political arena was once could moderate the hard 
liners. However, growing inevitable confrontation from the hard liners as political opposition 
may cause further conflict.  
I.6.3 Status Quo in Current Islam and Democracy Coexistence 
 Fundamentalists in general are opposing the concept of democracy. Democracy 
offered equality among the citizen before the law and in participative political decision. It is 
resulted to the same treatment from state to its citizens without any exception. However this 
collective rationality is contradicting the fundamentalists’ belief. They believed that the truth 
is solely on the text of holy and they are undoubted (Marti, 2007).23 Schwarzmantel (2011) 
called the opposition as a hostility idea to democracy. He argued that the final truths in 
democracy are basically illegitimate in fundamentalists’ eyes. Thus, the idea of conflicting 
democracy its characteristics such as freedom pluralism finally raised and the abuse of 
religious banner as legitimacy is prevalent to justify the violence.24  
In that sense, the fundamentalists are fully aware of the strategic value behind the 
banner of religion. The label of Islam frequently used as a shield upon critics and prosecution. 
Therefore, the violence that conducted by fundamentalists are not rooted from religious 
purposes. According to the research of International Peace Institute in Oslo, Islamic belief is 
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not as dangerous as Catholic majority in Latin America who has more tendencies towards 
violence. Furthermore, it suggests that religion was not the eminent factor causing act of 
violence. Instead of beliefs, political and economical motivations are the major factor which 
includes cross cultural, economic well being and the absence of democracy.25  
 While the fundamentalists stand against democracy, in a best scenario government 
acts as the agent of democracy and its elements. It is crucial for a new born democratic 
country like Indonesia to rebuild their democratic image after  economic and political turmoil 
in 1997-1998. The government kept on promoting the country as the world’s third largest 
democracy and most importantly, as an influential moderate Muslim majority. Many 
evidences illustrated Indonesia’s direction towards moderate Muslim influenced foreign 
policy. The country hosted a dialogue between Sunni and Shiah to bridge the long historical 
conflict between two. They also dispatched peace-keeping troops to Lebanon (Sukma, 
2011).26 Pr In 2012 Indonesia continued its contribution on the similar peace-keeping mission 
in southern Philippines Muslim region of Mindanao.  
 Still, despite some serious efforts to maintain their image as a moderate Islamic 
country, in a certain degree the government of Indonesia preserved its close relations to the 
fundamentalists.  The Wahabi Islamic discourse that originated from Saudi Arabia which has 
embedded in the fundamentalist’s ideology has undoubtedly becoming prominent power that 
the government can not resist. No wonder that some fundamentalists have involved in the 
decision making process of the secular state (Susanti, 2008).27  
Therefore, government attempted to embrace moderate image to garner a better 
international image as an agent of peace but in contrast for domestic purpose, government 
can not simply ignore the importance of being a friend of the fundamentalists. Even though 
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the relation between Islamist and the state have been always uneasy, there were always 
compromises between secularism and fundamentalism in the process of Indonesian statecraft. 
Indonesian government attempted to maintain a degree in which they are in the middle of 
between two different sides as a win-win solution. The strategy emerges for getting 
acceptance in both sides. Whenever the state perceived as too secular and pro-western, the 
threat of fundamentalist will find its momentum as it becomes a perfect political justification 
to fight against the regime that is allegedly standing behind the western interests. In the other 
hand, when it goes to a strong degree of Islamism, the state may lose their Islamic moderate 
image.  
I.6.4 Legal Instrument and Protection of Religious Freedom 
 Government generally respects religious freedom in law and its practice. In many 
democratic nations, religious freedom is one of their founding principles such as by the first 
amendment or federal law. In United States, The Civil Rights Division of Department of 
Justice enforces various decrees to ensure their people’s religious liberty.  
 The US were enacted as (1) Laws barring discrimination based on religion in 
employment, housing, credit, education, and access to public services; (2) The Religious 
Land Use which regulate zoning authorities from discriminating againts houses and religious 
schools; (3) Laws protecting the religious rights of institutionalized person and (4) criminal 
statutes making it federal crime to attack person or institution based on their religion or 
otherwise interefering their activities. 28  Thus, ideally according to the US standard the 
protection of religious freedom must cover many aspects that related to daily lives including 
anti discrimination in public service. Rather than issuing further discussion on law, this paper 
later will discuss how Indonesia’s decree protecting religious liberty. 
 19 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
STATE – ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST 
POWER AND LEGITIMACY RELATIONS 
II.1 State and Islamic Fundamentalists Relations in Historical Perspective (Post 
Independence Timeline) 
II.1.1 Guided Democracy Era (After Independence in 1945) 
Islamic marginalization was the key feature on Islam and state relations at the 
beginning of Indonesian statecraft. Yet, the shape of relations in this era colored current 
Indonesian government and Islam relations or vice versa particularly in the area of common 
law and basic constitution formulation.  There are five main occurrences during this era: 
Dispute of the Jakarta Charter (1945), insurrection of Indonesian Communist Party (1948), 
the uprising of local Islamic rebellion (1948-1962), the first democratic election (1955) and 
Communist party mass massacre (1965).29  
In the end of 1945, Japanese colonial government established the formation of 
BPUPKI (The Committee for Preparatory Work of Indonesian Independence) to formulate 
state’s constitution. Formulation of Indonesia’s first constitution raised the very first debate 
between nationalist and Islamic groups as the five basic principles of the nation did not 
mention Islam as a part of it. Under the pressure of Islamic groups, the phrase of ‘believe in 
God’ occurred as the most important element of state’s principle with some additional words 
“dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya” (with the obligatory 
principle of implementing Islamic law for Indonesian Muslim). The compromise finally did 
not turn Indonesia into an Islamic state. Indonesia’s choice as being a secular state has clearly 
stated by Soekarno, 
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“If we establish a state based on Islam many areas whose population is not 
Islamic such as Mollucas, Bali, Flores, Timor, and Kei Islands and Sulawesi 
will secede. And West Irian will not be a part of this republic”.  
Feeling unsatisfied with the consensus, ten years afterwards Islamic party pushed for 
the charter’s revision in order to accommodate their interest and ideology but once again they 
lost against the nationalists. Their attempts occur repeatedly in decades after 1940s as it 
discussed once more in 2002 and 2004 consecutively with no significant agreement for 
revision.30  
Shortly after Indonesia’s independence, the Indonesian left-wing that represented by 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) attempted to fight against the ruling regime by bloody 
insurrection for ideological ends. At the same moment, Darul Islam (DI) under Kartosuwiryo 
started struggling against the ruler with similar ideological objective which is the creation of 
an Islamic state. In comparison to the communist, Islamic movement gained meaningful 
support as many Muslim felt offended of Soekarno’s irreligious lifestyle and his support to 
the growing communism in the region.  The massive support to DI leads to the civil war 
between the state and DI. It marked as a superabundant guerilla which killed 15.000-40.000 
citizens. Unfortunately, the civil war resulted to the meaningless end at the Islamist side. This 
struggle against the regime highlighted a lesson-learn for Islamist that force-led or military 
struggle could not benefit the Islamist movement to pursue their ends because sufficient 
power was not at their own. Consequently for the Islamist, political strategy could be an 
option when the state pledged for democratic election later in 1955.31 
The first democratic election in 1955 brought a landslide victory for three main 
ideologies in Indonesia: nationalist, Islam and communist. Reformist Muslim Masyumi 
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accounted their significant vote at 20,9%, The  Islamic traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
at 18,4% and the smallest one, PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic 
Syarikat Party). The total vote of Islamic parties in 1955 was obviously in substantial number 
at roughly 42%. Even though their political power was tremendous according to the result of 
election, the standings of each party was divided. Thanks to the pluralistic Islam in indonesia, 
their stances towards Islamic state were appealing differently. Still, Masyumi as the largest 
party believed in “state based on Islam” which can be defined as Islam and Pancasila (State 
basic principles) coexistence.32  
In 1965, Indonesia  came to the darkest episode in its history. Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI) attempted to lead a coup aimed to eliminate anti communist high military official 
that ended up by massacre and regime turnover. Communist party was mislead by assuming 
that they had garnered rural citizen supports in doing so. In fact, Islamic parties were 
dominated rural political sphere by the existence of pesantren (Islamic traditional boarding 
school) all across Java, Indonesian Main Island. The traditional Islamist saw communist party 
as a serious threat for Islamic way of life never their agenda never matched Islamic rules. 
Together with the military, some youth Islamic organizations under played a major role on 
dragging the communists in rural areas. The massacre evidenced by the death of 100.000 to 
more than a million people. 33 
 
In a brief case, the era of Sukarno (Guided democracy) marked by  the relations 
between Islamic politics and the state as in major ups and downs. The pattern showed that the 
Islamist struggled to maintain the degree of Islamic influence within the public sphere: First 
by involving themselves in long debate of state’s basic principle and secondly by combating 
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the communists. The first intention underwent by standing against the ruling nationalist 
regime which promoted secularism but it did not work as intended. However, at the end of 
the era, Islamist allied with the state and stood at the barricades of discarding communism in 
Indonesia.  Islamist and the state obviously incorporated together to pursue their political 
ends.7  
II.1.2 New Order (Soeharto’s Era of Pancasila Democracy)8 
Successfully ousting Soekarno’s era of guided democracy, Indonesia trapped to the 
second pseudo democracy 9  where democratic rights and civil society were massively 
suppressed by state actors. This era endeavored by government control to any Islamic 
movement in both social and political spheres for the sake of economic development and 
modernization. The vision not only pressured political Islam but also Indonesian civil society 
as a whole. Aside from modernization and stability, the reason behind marginalization was 
successful elimination of communist threat in 1960s. State no longer needs Islamic power to 
counter communism and therefore started hamstringing Islamic movement from real politics.  
At the beginning of New Order era, marginalization of Islamic movement was 
apparent. The previously powerful Islamic party such as Masyumi, NU and PSII were 
fusioned into a single party namely PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United 
                                                          
7 Guided democracy is a political system in Indonesia that took place between 1957 to the beginning 
of 1966. The system suggests that western style of democracy would never match theirs. Instead, 
Soekarno believed that discussion and consensus under the guidance of the leaders possess 
Indonesian characteristics which appropriate to be implemented in the country.  
8 Pancasila democracy is political system that refers to the five basic principles of Indonesia. It has 
been implemented in Indonesia’s political system from the late 1960s to 1998. The system believed 
that the decision making could be achieved through consensus with no opposition.  
9 Modified democracy 
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Development Party). Islamic symbol and ideology within the existing party were abolished 
and revised by Pancasila (state ideology) as a single ideology for their political platforms. 
The use of Pancasila as political basis was relatively easier as it has embedded in every 
citizen’s mind by radical education of state ideology since their childhood. In addition, the 
regime also regulated the Ulama’10 by domesticating their force into a single government 
controlled organization, The Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI (Indonesian Council of 
Ulema’). The body assigned for issuing legal Islamic opinions or fatwa which found mostly 
legitimizing government policy.34  
Suharto’s effort to limit Islamic political force triggered numerous menaces. A 
fundamentalist group called Pola Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam (the Model of 
Revolutionary Islam Movement) attacked the head quarter of Indonesian National Assembly 
in 1978. Another notable assault was marked on the tragedy of an attempt to hijack a Garuda 
Indonesia’s fleet in 1981 which led by the ex-Darul Islam member. Surprisingly, they were 
some actors who employed by state intelligence to discard communism decades ago. The 
battle between the state and Islamist finally mounted in Tanjung Priok Affair in 1984 which 
killed unidentified number of people.35 
Successfully controlled Islamic movement, Soeharto began to accommodating Islam 
in the late 1980s. The appearance of Islamic symbol and tradition in public sphere were 
becoming apparent and publicly accepted. Suharto also performed pilgrimage to Mecca and 
his daughter started wearing hijab with particular style that symbolizes moderate Indonesian 
Islam. Thus, State again incorporated Islam in order to prevent possible future threat that 
challenge Suharto’s political power.36 This argument suggested by Hefner (2002). He argued 
                                                          
10 Islamic Preachers. In Indonesia the preachers are often participating in politics 
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that the state sponsored religious movement was not intended to support Islam. Instead, state 
wants to deter cultural globalization influence to Indonesia. The element of cultural 
globalization such as western democracy or communism would become a serious threat for 
authoritarianism. 37 
II.1.3 Reformasi  Era (Democratization) 
Post-Suharto’s era was the turning point of Islamic fundamentalist movement which 
suddenly came as significant power. The regime change enabled further religious discourses, 
identities and rise of various religious movements including Chinese belief, Confucianism 
that has long been banned by the government. Reformasi or democratization process and its 
aftermath after 1998 were frequently pointed out as a standoff for religious diversity 
management. During democratic transition, the banners of religion were often abused for 
simply gaining political interest.  
Soon after the demise of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, the discourse of Islamic law 
or Sharia became a prominent issue discussed in various government level, from local 
government to national. The appeal of Sharia law was supported by Islamic parties in 
Indonesian parliament such as PPP (which has turned to an be an Islamic party), PBB (Partai 
Bulan Bintang or Moon and Star Party) and the rising star PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or 
Welfare and Justice Party). At the same time, the enactment of new local autonomy law 
which enables local participation on policy formulation facilitated the trend of Sharia law in 
various regions. It was somehow implemented at the expense of individual rights. Indonesia 
finally witnessed the story of Sharia implementation that enacted firstly in Aceh, the 
northernmost region. Special autonomous region status held by Aceh allowed the practice of 
Sharia in a form of one country two systems with special law separated from the common law. 
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Shortly afterwards many regions followed the Acehnese paths, Solok regency in West 
Sumatera necessitate Quranic literacy for its citizen; then suddenly the similar thing was 
plethora in West Java and many more regions with different forms: the prohibition of liquor, 
a duty of women for wearing headscarf, and regulations of business hours during fasting 
month Ramadhan.38  
The law enacment and implementation of Sharia was sustained not only by supports 
of Islamic party but also by Islamic Fundamentalist group.39 It is prevalent that whenever 
Ramadhan comes, hard liners group such as HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) or FPI conducted 
some operations in entertainment venues and any other places that deemed as against Islamic 
norms. The operations mostly came with street level violence and no concrete measure from 
government bodies to control the thug actions. Many evidences showed the government 
turned their eyes blind to cope with the fundamentalists. Even if Indonesian police was so 
heroic on battling terrorism under Jamaah Islamiyah as, they always seemed unwilling to 
deal with fundamentalist.  
In addition to the government reluctance to deal with the fundamentalists, the group 
also maintained their good relations to various Islamist networks across Indonesia such as 
Islamic schools called Madrasa, religious gathering, mosques and media. Those relations 
framed into man to man interaction indoctrination to motivate the people on doing their 
version of jihad. 
II.2 Power and Legitimacy Seeking Within the Relations 
This first part of analysis will explain the mutual coexistence of power seeking of 
both actors between the fundamentalist and state. As it said earlier by Nasr (2001), Islamic 
Fundamentalism and its tools are apparently the source of state’s hegemony. Even though the 
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government considered Islamic fundamentalists as a threat, they saw them as opportunity for 
getting more power and legitimacy. In that sense, state and the fundamentalist are mutually 
benefit each other in terms of pursuing greater power. The existence of fundamentalist may 
boost state actor power which can be defined by either politician or state agencies. 
In Jakarta, the center of Indonesia’s administration and barometer of national 
democracy, the nuance of powerful fundamentalists were evident. The Islamist party such as 
PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/Justice and Welfare Party) gained significant vote during the 
previous national election in 2009. In this region, PKS was placed on the second after the 
current ruling party (Democratic Party or PD). PKS sustained its popularity at top three 
despite the fact that PD was outperformed PKS in 2009.  
 
  Table 3. Local Election Result in Jakarta Special Capital Region, 2009 
NO PARTY TOTAL VOTES PERCENTAGE 
1  Partai Demokrat (Democratic 
Party) 1.208.855  33,58%  
2  Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice 
and Welfare Party) 620.207  17,23%  
3  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic 
Struggle Party)  
386.533  10,74%  
4  Partai Golkar (Functionalist 
Group) 232.778  6,47%  
5  Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya  
(Great Indonesian Movement 
Party) 
185.924  5,16%  
6  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(United Development Party) 185.375  5,15%  
7  Partai Amanat Nasional (National 
Mandate Party) 150.236  4,17%  
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Table 4. Local Election Result in Jakarta Special Capital Region, 2004 
NO PARTY TOTAL VOTES PERCENTAGE 
1  Partai Demokrat (Democratic 
Party) 812.884 25,06% 
2  Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice 
and Welfare Party) 941.684 29,03% 
3  Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic 
Struggle Party)  
543.230 16,75% 
4  Partai Golkar (Functionalist 
Group) 332.003 10,23% 
5  Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya  
(Great Indonesian Movement 
Party) 
(became a new party 
in 2009)  
6  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 
(United Development Party) 303.755 9.4% 
7  Partai Amanat Nasional (National 
Mandate Party) 309.665 9,2% 
 
Thus, Islamist party was basically had a considerable electability among people in Jakarta. 
The popularity urged PKS to nominate their own candidate for local governor election in 
Jakarta. Jakarta’s governor is widely known as a powerful figure among Indonesians. It 
sometimes considered as Indonesia Third, or the third most influential people after 
Indonesian President and Vice President. Still, The nomination process was tough on the side 
of the Islamists. PKS had to compete with large coalition body consisted of 19 parties. After 
all, the result was easily predicted, PKS failed to place its own candidate in the city hall with 
only 24% against 72%. Despite the defeat, Islamists have flexed their muscles as a significant 
power in the capital.  
 Nevertheless, further research is necessary to find out the relations between PKS and 
other Islamic fundamentalist wings. What was obvious is that the supporters of 
fundamentalism in Jakarta are existed in tremendous number of civilian. Thus, it could be a 
considerable source of power for any politicians in Jakarta in particular and generally in 
Indonesia.  
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Some evidences showed a good relation between the state actor and the 
fundamentalists. A report published by Australian agency revealed that the governor of 
Jakarta, Fauzi Bowo and Chief of Indonesian Police, Timur Pradopo attended Islamic 
Defenders Front (FPI) anniversary. It also evidenced that Timur Pradopo intended to 
maintain their close ties to FPI for securing Jakarta. Moreover in 2010, Fauzi called FPI 
contribution to monitor Muslim’s behavior during fasting month Ramadhan. 40  The 
approaches concreted the allegation of power seeking. Fundamentalist group deemed as 
possessing potential attraction to be embraced.  
 Furthermore, any support to fundamentalist means larger support from media. For 
opportunist politician, media support can boost their popularity upon the upcoming election. 
A survey conducted by The Pantau Foundation, Jakarta’s based research institute on 
journalism concluded that more than 50% of Indonesian journalist support the idea of 
fundamentalism. The survey revealed that more than 60% of journalists are in favor to idea of 
banning Ahmadiyahh even though 96% of them believed that it is their obligation to convey 
the voice of minority and 70% agreed that human rights issue is very important. It was also 
said that they basically agreed with the MUI fatwa which prohibiting secularism and 
liberalism.41 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
FLAWS IN INDONESIA’S NEW DEMOCRACY  
AND THE RISE OF HARDLINERS 
 
This chapter will argue that democracy was not the best solution to combat 
fundamentalism, hardliners and their consequences. Democracy in fact has some limits that 
potentially boost fundamentalist power to pursue their political ends.  
 
III.1 The Absence of Centralized State 
Scharzmantel (2011) argued that the absence of centralized state that could effectively 
enforce rules and regulations to the community makes the violence highly probable.42 The 
absence of a centralized state in a new democracy like Indonesia  is apparently inevitable. In 
the context of Indonesia’s democracy, central government had to give up some of their 
control functions and authorities to lower level of government such as privincial government, 
the municipalities and the regencies.  Again in  Indonesian context, democratic 
transformation allowed local administration to possess higher degree of autonomy which 
facilitated local authorities to regulate and control their citizen in many ways and in some 
degrees particularly by religious regulations. The number of religious regulation has been 
increased year on year after democratization.  The data below depicts that there are at least 
139 regulations have been enacted since 1999 and surprisingly, there are only 9 provinces out 
of 33 provinces that do not possess such regulations. The number depicts that 72,72% local 
government in the country attempted to have religious regulations. 
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Table 5. Number of Religious Regulation in Indonesia 
Year Number of Province Number of Religious Regulation 
1999 3 3 
2000 4 7 
2001 6 20 
2002 9 15 
2003 10 29 
2004 8 18 
2005 9 25 
2006 8 13 
2007 3 3 
2008 5 5 
2009 1 1 
Total  139 
 
The higher discretion on local government’s hands nowadays means significant 
pressure to women’s rights and the religious minorities. Some of the Sharia Laws were 
enacted at the expense of freedom simply for fundamentalist supporters’ political interests.43 
In that sense, pressures given to women and minorities were acted by state actor to gain some 
non-state political actor supports. The forms of pressure were literally not in violence. Instead, 
it appeared as coercive measures by law. Aceh is the evident where Sharia Law was 
massively implemented in daily lives. The most recent example was obvious. The 
Lhokseumawe city mayor banned straddling on motorcycle for the local women under the 
banner of sharia law. Critics argued that instead of protecting women’s rights, the 
government imposes restrictions on them. It is indeed against the spirit of Sharia. In fact 
Sharia Law was designed by prophet Muhammad to protect women against strict patriarchal 
Arab society at that time. The prophet condemned the tradition of legalizing women as the 
second class of society where men were able to inherit them to others. Women were merely 
object rather than subject in society. The prophet bravely broke out the damaging social order 
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by reforming the structure. He emphasized the equal rights for women through his sayings 
and deeds. Thus, it is strongly doubtful when the mayor of Lhokseumae claimed that bylaw 
his regulation was aiming at protecting Islamic values and morality in the region. The rule 
presumed that women straddling on motorcycle may lead to men’s sexual misconduct. Again, 
it resembles patriarchy of the Arabs in the seventh century. Women largely perceived as 
object of sexual harassment, the major cause of misconduct instead of a civilian that state 
stand in the frontier to provide security and well-being.  
Muhtada (2013) argued that there are three main reasons as to why the ruler stood 
against the spirit of real Sharia brought by Prophet Muhammad and imposed Sharia Law in 
Lhokseumawe. First, Muhtada assumes that the policy maker has limited understanding of 
Sharia. Second, the mayor stated that the regulation has been consulted and approved by 
several political parties and Ulama. In this stance, it is highly probable that strong patriarchal 
culture within Aceh society affected the decision making. Unfortunately, the influence given 
by the Ulema was failed to translate the real meaning of Sharia. Third, the government 
attempted to attract political elites, any particular segments who are in favor of introducing 
any regulation that sounds ‘Islamic’ regardless its substantial meaning and objectives.44   
As well as Muhtada in his third argument, Crouch (2003) also suggests that the state 
had to compromise religious regulations in order to maintain a good relationship with Islamic 
political parties. The parties are widely known for their stances with the religious regulations. 
In 2006, a legislative petition by several political parties against religious regulations faced 
the challenge by counter-petition from Justice and Welfare Party, the country’s largest 
Islamist party.45 Therefore, resisting religious regulation in political level could be harsh; a 
grass root approach seems to be a more realistic alternative.  
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III.2 Minimum Institutional Constraint  
Eubank and Weinberg argued that extremist attack is frequently happened in democracy 
because of the absence of institutional constraint in open societies that may restrict their 
movement.46 Shortly it could be understood that freedom of speech, freedom of expression 
and freedom of forming any organization with less government control are the initial 
condition of fundamentalism momentum. In other words, the demise of Soeharto provided 
some political opportunities which allowed some fundamentalist identities to contest freely in 
a newly public sphere.47  
 Azca (2012) illustrated how the elements of political openings in democracy could 
facilitate the youth who are in search of identity to participate in radical movement through 
public sphere such as student organization. In contrast to Suharto regime, introducing any 
organization without legally approved permission in a campus or school is widely acceptable 
since 1998. As the result, many new Islamist movements were formed and attracted students 
across the country. Azca explained the phenomenon in some rationalizations, mainly the 
ambiance of political dynamics during the transition that were full of uncertainties. At the 
time, political structures were changed radically. It opened up political opportunity that 
enable Islamic organization to grow and at same time aimed to defend their identity in 
battleground of religious conflicts: Ambon (Mollucas/Maluku) and Poso (Central Sulawesi). 
Some others attempted to fight unfair global regime by Bali bombing while the most 
moderated one moved by participating through formal politics through Justice and Welfare 
Party (PKS) in Indonesian parliament.48  
 Azca rejected the argument of economic motivation as something behind the 
radicalism in Indonesia. Esposito and Mogahed (2007) supported the stance, their research in 
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several Muslim countries showed that there is no significant differences of unemployment 
rate between the radicals and moderates, both at roughly 20%. Thus, Azca pointed out at 
cognitive opening in micro-sociology that makes Indonesian youth easily accepting new 
ideas during transition. Still, even though economic motivation was not a significant variable 
contributing to cognitive opening to radicalism, the process was widely happened in youth at 
lower income class. A research conducted by Gerry Van Klinken (2010) showed a tendency 
towards radicalism and social class in Indonesia. Indonesian middle class are likely into 
liberal perspective while the lower income are more into exclusivism and illiberal. Moreover, 
the lower income is in favor of political authoritarianism, apolitical and unsatisfied of their 
lives. In contrast, the middle class are supporting democracy and further change in politics. 
However, social class was not the only variable, there were two other important variables: 
ideology and social networking.49  
 The story of intially named Budi was evidenced.  Budi is currently the leader of 
Salafi-Wahabi11 movement in Ambon, one of the frontier for fundamentalist movement. Budi 
was a graduate from Department of Politics and Governance in Gadjah Mada University, 
Indonesia. Instead of growing-up in a strict Muslim family, he was born from abangan 
Muslim community, a local slank term for non-practical Muslim. Considering the lack of 
Islamic education in his surrounding, he decided to join Islamic Boarding School during his 
junior high school. Later in Gadjah Mada University, he exposed to a wide variety of Islamic 
mainstreams that contributed to one of his biggest intellectual and cultural shock ever. First, 
he joined HMI, a union for Muslim students where he found out that they considered meeting 
as a more important activity than compulsory Islamic rituals such as daily prayer. The shock 
                                                          
11 The Salafis and Wahabis think they have exclusive rights to be a true Muslim.  
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made him shopped around, he joined various Islamic organizations afterwards. At the end, he 
ascertained that salafi-wahabi suits him best. His active involvement in such organization 
sent him to two serious battlegrounds: Ambon and Poso.12 Identity rationalization was behind 
his decision, he heard that his fellow Muslim were massively suppressed by the Christians in 
both regions.50  
 Azca provided another evidences illustrating the identity shock that leads to 
radicalism caused by the information spread in social media and wider public sphere. Awod, 
a local activist in Solo (Central Java) unveiled his first experience while watching the Muslim 
massacre video in Sulawesi. The story flows as it easily predicted, he felt a real sadness and 
simpathy to his Muslim fellows. An identity sentiment crossed his mind that he should 
defend the Muslim community by his own hand referring to the prophetic tradition. It says 
that the entire Muslim community is like a human body, while one of them is being hurt, the 
whole body may suffer the pain. Awod finally decided to go to Ambon and Maluku. As well 
as Awod, Abu Ayyash went to Ambon and Poso after witnessing news that illustrates the 
massacre of 800 Muslims a day. Abu Ayyash, father of a newly born child, was grown up in 
a non-practical Muslim community, in the middle of prostitution area in Central Java. The 
moral shock of Muslim massacre in Ambon triggered him to join the movement.51  
 Other than Islamic identity factor, Azca showed individual political motivation by 
joining the fundamentalists. The experience of Jihad  in their definition create an open 
opportunity to reach a higher social status within the radical organization and beyond. An 
honor emblem given by the fundamentalist group provides pride, respect, and loyalty from 
                                                          
12 Ambon and Poso was becoming batteground for the Indonesian fundamentalists due to some 
religious conflicts between local Muslims and Christians. Fundamentalist went there to help their 
fellow Muslims to fight against the Christians.  
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another member. Most of the respondents admitted political rewards following the promotion. 
Awod finally elected as the leader of Moon and Crescent Party; Abu Ayyash was in charge of 
Islamic Defender Front in Pekalongan (Central Java) for two periods of election; Surahman, 
an activist of tarbiyah  movement who joined the battle in Ambon (Maluku), nowadays 
became the leader of nation’s largest Islamic party (Justice and Welfare party)  in Maluku.52  
 Following the previous evidence, the spread of political identity and religious 
sentiment as the seed of radicalism was grown through public spheres that tremendously 
banned before Indonesian democratization. The recent research conducted by Syarif 
Hidayatullah Islamic University suggested that all the respondents from the radical groups 
were greatly influenced by newly written religious literatures and discussion with group 
leaders.53   Thus, it implies that the absence of regulations and institutional constraint in 
Indonesian democracy has contributed to growing fundamentalism.  
 The origin of fundamentalist paramilitaries itself was in fact inherited from the past 
regime (new order era under Suharto). Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) was a state sponsored 
paramilitary with direct assistance from high ranking military official called by ‘the green 
officers’. FPI was the frontier of battle against Globalization that represented by the United 
States and their interests. In October 2001, they attempted to shut down the US Embassy in 
Jakarta and conducted massive sweeping to find Americans or British in town. Despite its 
bad reputation, FPI has the longest history of collaboration with police and military. FPI 
gained support for their role as preman, a gang  or a group of thug who used to enforce 
interest with criminalities. Suharto regime was also known for using Pemuda Pancasila or 
the Youth of Pancasila (State Ideology) to cleansing the communists. Likewise, FPI was a 
new form of preman used for political rivalry, competition and imposing political interests by 
uncivil forces in a newly civil society. After Indonesian political reform, FPI gained their 
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greatest power when the centralized power finally destroyed in second and the state capacity 
was broke into intra-elite competition.54  
 Thus, democracy and political openings with limited institutional constraint in 
Indonesia allowed fundamentalist movement to strengthen their existence so that they could 
easily force their own agendas. The sphere is not only limited through Islamic organization 
but also through mass media, cyber-world, and educational institutions.  
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO: 
A DEGREE OF POLITICAL ISLAM WITHIN A SECULAR STATE 
 
 Confirming the literature review in previous chapter, Schwarzmantel proposed the 
argument that the fundamentalists are basically opposing the idea of democracy. The reason 
was clear, democracy is the rule of majority so that in fundamentalist point of view it failed to 
convey the highest ultimate truth. In contrast, State is likely to be an agent of democracy, 
asserting truth through the voice of majority. Still, while the majority is becoming a silent 
majority, the active voice heard by the state might be the fundamentalists’ voice and 
aspiration. Consequently the state has to compromise fundamentalist’s interest as an 
important consideration of their policy. Any policy agenda that contradicts the fundamentalist 
value somehow perceived as opposition against Islam as a a whole. Thus, the role of state has 
turned in reverse. They suddenly act in favor of fundamentalist value and idea to prevent 
deeper hostility towards the ruling regime. However, the state’s behavior is somewhat 
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swinging as the pendulum. At some extent, it could swing back and the state became the 
advocate of democracy.  
 
IV.1 The Policy Dilemma of Protecting The Ahmadis13 
In response of massive opposition against the existence of Ahmadiyah across 
Indonesia, the government releases a decree banning Ahmadiyah religious activity. The 2008 
joint ministerial decree indirectly justified vandalism by damaging mosques, forcibly closing 
religious activities, and some Ahmadis were killed in mob violence in East Java. In statistics, 
there were more than 50 mosques that have been vandalized. Following the decree, some 
governors legally approved the banning of Ahmadis and prohibited their religious practices. 
In Jakarta, local government did not allow construction of house of worship in their area due 
to local zoning rules. In other region such as in West Java, South Sulawesi and West Nusa 
Tenggara, the fundamentalists successfully pressure local authorities to ban the place of 
worship. Several local NGO reports suggest some information that Ahmadiyah people are 
forcibly demanded to renounce their faith to the mainstream Islam, some others faced the 
problem of debt cancellation.55  
Protecting the minority such as Ahmadiyah is huge undertaking for the government. 
The existence of Ahmadis is perceived as deviancy and by law it is against the blasphemy 
law that describes “hostility, hatred, or contempt against religion”. The law punishes its 
suspect by at least 5 years punishment in prison.56 This law allows local administration to 
sentence the practice of Ahmadiyah. Moreover, at the expense of public interest in terms of 
prevention of sect proliferation, the fundamentalists demanded the ban of Ahmadiyah legally. 
                                                          
13 Ahmadis is a term explaining those who embrace Ahmadiyahh, a sect in Islam that believes of the 
existence of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as another prophet after Muhammad 
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Thus, the protection of religious freedom to some extent could be perceived as violation 
against the law. Moreover, according to Wahid Institute, there are some Islamic sects were 
disbanded as requested by the local religious leader such as Nurul Amal, Jamaah Islam Suci  
and even a non-mainstream Christian sect called the Sion City of Allah was also disbanded. 
Therefore, the state was seemingly weak by tolerating a demand of religious freedom 
violation because of the decree that enacted by itself.   
The problem of tolerating intolerance of religious freedom in law sourced from claims 
that the rejection of Wahabi’s perspective will be construed as opposing Islam and its law 
(Wahid, 2003).57 The stance for indirectly supporting the fundamentalist argument finally 
leaves the state in favor of fundamentalism. Moreover, fundamentalist’s idea has largely 
infiltrated government bodies that are in charge of formulating regulations. In example, 
Observers had found extremists’ infiltration to Majelis Ulema Indonesia (MUI), a quasi 
government institution established to control Indonesian Muslim. Through MUI, the 
fundamentalist dictated Indonesian Muslim majority and controlled government actions at the 
expense of Islamic law.58  
 
IV.2 Indonesia In Search of Balance: Secularism vs Islamism 
Analyzing the tendency of Indonesian political ideology is intriguing. Although it was 
officially declared that Indonesia claimed itself as a secular state, there is no clear evidence of 
whether Indonesians are tend to be secular or Islamist in practice. Therefore it is quite 
reasonable as to why Indonesian government maintains some policy tendencies in favor of 
both secularism and Islamism. The reason behind the ambiguity occurs from considerable 
number of perception of supporting the fundamentalists.  
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 Many scholars have been questioning Indonesia’s direction towards democracy, will 
Indonesia be a secular or a Muslim democracy? or could it be truly a secular democracy as it 
mentioned in state’s basic principle? According to election trend in national and local level, it 
is indicated that Indonesia has moved towards secular democracy. In provincial level, 
Islamist could only win in one out of 33 provinces which was in Nusa Tenggara. In city and 
municipal level, the Islamists grabbed only seven out of 444 positions. As well as in local 
level, in national level Islamists could only attract 24% of voters in 2009 while the majority 
went to secular parties. Moreover, the 2007 survey conducted by LSI (Lingkaran Survey 
Indonesia /Indonesian Survey Networks) found that 72% of respondent did not oppose 
women as president; 63% opposed headscarf-wearing policy; and 61% rejected the idea of 
amputation for the thieves.  
Indonesian secularism is not surprising. In 32 years Suharto had established a market 
oriented economy that produced rapid growth. Aiming at a stable and vibrant economy, 
Suharto sometimes repressed the fundamentalists and at the end, they incorporated Suharto 
for resources. Instead of confronting Suharto, they decided to join government-supported 
educational institutions as critical tool towards upward mobility in social and political life. 
Thus, educational relations successfully reconciled the relations of the state and the 
fundamentalists (Effendy, 2003). 
Still, despite a massive support to secular democracy, according to the similar LSI 
survey there are some respondents in favor of radicalism. 20% of the respondents approved 
Al-Qaeda’s attack to World Trade Center in 2001; 10% justified Bali bombing; 20% of them 
also agreed of executing apostates. The 2010 Pew Global Survey also indicates the same 
trend. In Muslim countries such as Indonesia, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt, the survey 
finds that the attributes of modernity often coexist with support of amputation punishment, 
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stoning for adulterers, and death penalty.59 Therefore, even though Indonesia’s current ruling 
party is secular; they could not resist the demand of fundamentalist ideas of enacting a 
regulation such as anti pornography law.  
Beside the purpose of securing votes by accommodating fundamentalist interest, the 
democrats also considered ‘the rainbow coalition’ which formed from various political 
parties including Islamist party. 60  The fact indicates that accommodating the needs of 
fundamentalist interest has become necessary. Dalpino (2008) called the phenomenon as 
Indonesia’s inclusive approach to Islamist parties.61 By allowing the some Islamist parties to 
join the political arena, government hopes to minimize potency of radicalism. Aceh was the 
evidence, government allowed many Islamist parties to contest in local elections.  
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
LEGAL INSTRUMENT AND PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Indonesia has basically ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Under article 18(2) it says, “no one shall be subject to coercion which would impair 
his freedom to have or to adopt religion or believe of his choice”. Thus, Legal instrument is 
essential as it provides some directions for the state to enforce rule of law in order to ensure 
its citizen religious librety. This chapter will briefly examine legal instrument in Indonesia 
and its adequacy in protecting religious liberty.  
 
V.1 Policy/Legal Instrument Formulation: The Case of GKI Yasmin Church 
 The local administration of Bogor City issued a decree of sealing the  GKI Yasmin 
Church. The church was initially approved legally by the government by issuing legal 
permission for its construction in February 15, 2006.  In 2012, suddenly the government 
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changed their mind by issuing a letter number 645.45-137. Bogor City government officially 
sealed GKI Yasmin Church with no sufficient explanation. It is interesting to note on why  
the government decided to do so. This case will also explain the pattern of legal instrument 
formulation process for protecting religious liberty in Indonesia.  The scheme of policy/ 
decree formulation is illustrated by the following diagram: 
Diagram 2. Scheme of Policy Formulation Process in Yasmin Church Case 
 
 
 
 
 
not supporting   supporting 
 
      demand         demand 
 
Limited Interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Martin Arianto Gumilang. Relations of The State and Religion in Religious Policy 
Formulation in Indonesia. an Undergraduate Thesis at Department of Public Policy and 
Management. Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2012.  
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From the above diagram, it can be inferred that the decree on banning the church was 
fundamentalist bias. There are several reasons as to why the policy formulation could not 
satisfy  the minority Christians. First, the Bogor City mayor was elected by major support 
from Welfare and Justice Party, local’s largest Islamic party. It is quite reasonable that the 
Mayor could not resist his party demand. Second, even though FORKAMI as Islamist Group 
position in policy debate is equal to GKI Church position; Bogor House of Assembly and 
Joint Decree of Home and Religious Ministry was in favor of supporting FORKAMI 
argument. Therefore, GKI Church’s stance is deemed weaker than FORKAMI.  
In many cases, this pattern is repeated. Many of Indonesia’s decree is considered as 
minority bias due to the fundamentalist pressure in policy formulation. The following review 
of Indonesia’s legal instrument will deepen this argument.  
 
V.2 Laws and Institutions That Indirectly Suppress Religious Freedom 
 Despite a clear statement in constitution article 28E that Indonesia guarantees 
freedom of religion that each person has the right to choose and believe according to his 
conscience, according to Human Rights Watch (2013), there are significant legal obstacles to 
religious freedom in Indonesia: 
1. The 1965 anti-blasphemy law 
The 1965 anti-blasphemy law in article 156 A of penal code contradicts human rights 
standard on freedom of religion. This law in fact, targets who express hostility and 
disgrace against any religion. Practically, instead of maintaing peace and harmonious 
environment, this law becomes a weapon of radical Islam to destroy others. The 
Jakarta Post reported a case in Maluku in 2008. There was an accusation to a school 
teacher who taught an offensive lecture in his class about a religion. Consequently, a 
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mob came and destroyed houses around the school.62 The teacher also ended up in 
court for blasphemy. Since 2005, dozens have been sentenced for blasphemy and 
since 1965, countless religious minorities were attacked.  
This anti blasphemy law according to Freedom House ignited intolerance and often 
used to justify discrimination against religious minority as the law itself justifies 
Islamic extremist group to take things into their own hands.63 The government in the 
other side denied to review the law. Minister of Religious Affairs said,  
“government requested judges to deny assertion of blasphemy law review 
because those who oppose anti-blasphemy law have not clear legal standing. 
This law is basically needed to maintain harmony among religions”.64  
In addition, Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister of Law and Human Rights 
argued that Islamic groups would only attack if blasphemy law is violated.  
2. Joint ministrial decree by Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs 
titled “Guideliness for Regional Heads in Maintaining Religious Harmony, 
Empowering Religious Harmony and Constructing Houses of Worship” released in 
2006. The decree heavily regulates that construction of religious building should be in 
accordance to statistics, the number of of house of worship must be based on real 
needs and population composition. Therefore, the law mandates permit of 
constructing house of worship requires list of name at least 90 people living around 
the constructing area, support from at least 60 people who reside in the area, obtains 
official permission from Minister of Religious Affairs and local Religious Harmony 
Forum.  
By nature this law aims to prevent conflict among religions by restricting construction 
of house of worships. However, stories from the field illustrate that the decree was 
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largely used by Islamist to prevent Christians constructing their churces. Islamists 
argued that their opposition was due on limiting ‘christianization’, effort in spreading 
christian religion accross the country.  The previous case of banning GKI Yasmin 
church was an impact of the decree. Islamists used the decree to pressure government.  
3. a Joint decree issued by the minister of Religious Affairs, the Attorney General, and 
Minister of Home Affairs stating that the Ahmadis has to stop spreading the beliefs 
throughout the country. This decree allows local government to formulate their own 
regulation on banning Ahmadiyah. As a result there are more than 22 regulations 
attempt to stop Ahmadiyah  that created by mayoralties and regencies. Some 
Indonesia’s most populated provinces such as West Java, East Java and North 
Sumatra prohibited Ahmadiyah activities. In that sense, religious affairs has been 
decentralized, it is awkwardly occur because religious matters are the domain of 
central government in Indonesia.  
Shortly after the decree is released, violence against Ahmadiyah is going up sharply. 
The incidents rose from 50 in 2010 to 114 in 2011.65  
 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
V.1 Conclusion 
This study has a purpose to discover the causes of state’s not to do policy to protect 
religious freedom against the intolerant fundamentalists. The research model is developed by 
constructing three basic arguments: the relations of Islamic fundamentalist that will affect 
state’s commitment to protect human rights; the dysfunctional democracy that facilitates the 
development of fundamentalism; and state’s behavior to maintain the ambiguity between 
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secularism and Islamism which potentially embrace two different interests at the same time. 
In historical perspective, it is evidenced that the state has attempted to incorporate 
Islamic fundamentalist for the sake of combating communist ideology and political ends. At 
the end of Sukarno era, fundamentalist joined movement to combat communism as the 
Sukarno regime were in support of communist spread throughout the country. In New order 
or Suharto era, despite the significant repression to the fundamentalists, the state again 
incorporated them for countering new ideology that widely spread by globalization. In 
democratization era, political pragmatism colored the relations. State actor and opportunist 
politicians exploited the fundamentalists to attract voters and radical media.  
State also faced some problems to deter negative impact of the growing 
fundamentalism. Indonesia’s democracy gave less institutional constraint that allowed 
Islamist power to boost their ends. Public sphere with inadequate supervision such as 
discussion, organization, and social networks have helped the development of fundamentalist 
discourse in general public. Moreover, decentralization and autonomy opportunity was 
largely abused by local leaders to promote many religious decrees. The regulations were 
mostly enacted at the expense of women and religious minorities.  
Lastly, the ambiguity of state’s stance between secularism and Islamism; and the fear 
of losing Islamic majority support or concerns of being accused as an advocate of the enemy 
Islam, provides a room for the fundamentalists to infiltratee decision making. It affects state’s 
behavior from being the frontier of secular democracy to being fundamentalist friendly 
decision maker.  
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